Even in the 1970s, however, one can easily find extreme examples of other approaches: 'topomorphical analyses' and 'disambiguating texts'; attempts to apply, or misapply, Heisenberg's principle of physical uncertainty to intellectually created works of art; the belief that all writing is an attempt to 'facilitate slavery' -and hence the argument that, while Houyhnhnms do not write, the Yahoos do, because their 'decorative shit smearing' may be, may it not, the beginning of a script? 3 Until very recently, the response of both our major reviewing magazines has been to dismiss the newer trends either with scorn or with cheerful insouciance, whether these trends seemed outrageous or just a little in advance of our times. Yet one finds, upon examining any group of modern criticism in our period that, whether outrageous or restrained, all share certain characteristics which would seem to contradict certain of our formalist assumptions, and to challenge the 'traditional' attitudes of the eighteenth century, in cosmology and thence in morality, epistemology, and metaphysics.
First, most schools of modern criticism are focused upon the less conscious and more shifting levels of the mind of the reader and/or author. The structuralist's rejection of apparent content in favor of mythopoeic form; the Freudian theory of art as a release of tension, as an expression of psychic desires; the phenomenological assertion of interest not in the external world per se but in mental perceptions of it, in the 'deep structures of the mind,' 4 so that the objective/subjective dichotomy is transformed into complete overlap; reader-response and authorinterrelational criticism: all these schools use the conscious, rational mind as an instrument for analyzing critical responses to a work of art, yet none are much interested in the conscious, rational reading or writing of a work, and many in fact would deny such acts are possible.
Second, despite a great variety of approaches and definitions of the work of art, a similar unity can be found lying behind this apparent diversity. Many phenomenologists, for example, seem often merely to go a step beyond the formalists or new Critics in their assertion that the 'essential work' is a pattern of themes. Yet that apparent emphasis upon recurring patterns in fact leads to a split between the 'meaning' of the work (what those patterns signified to the author) and its 'significance' (what they may mean to present readers). 5 This assertion that different readings may coexist in time or over time is part of the modern movement that finally redefines the nature of the literary work. For the structuralists, or for many of them, details have meaning only in so far as they are fitted into the structure; relationships are all. The 'content' is the 'structure'; the 'structure' is the 'content.' (Take, for example, a most distinguished Canadian critic, Professor Nor-throp Frye. Prof. Frye does not like to be considered a structuralist, and certainly he differs in some major ways from Lévi-Strauss or the early Roland Barthes. Nevertheless, he announced some years ago that, first, THE mythopoeic structure of 'The Rape of the Lock' was the descent-tothe-underworld pattern and that, given that pattern, Clarissa's speech was an authorial intrusion -by implication at least, an authorial error. 6 
)
And that position is a way-station along the road to Barthes' latest position, to that of Derrida and other post-structuralists, that the literary work is the interplay of relationships, by nature unstable, shifting, dynamic. As Terry Eagleton puts it, the work cannot mean anything beyond the pleasure of 'the endless play of signifiers.' 7 Thus, the work itself, the author, the reader, and the relationships among it, its author, and its readers, all become examples of Martin Buber's 'I-Thou' relationship. The 'I,' whether author or reader, is continuously mutable, as is the work of art which has become animated, either across time or in its own miniature cosmos. Hence the 'reality' of art in a sense coheres only in relationships, and these relationships reflect the belief that Being itself assumes the often illusionary, and always shifting, behaviour of Locke's secondary characteristics. 8 These ideas on Art and on Being permeate much of modern criticism in one way or another. For example, the view of the eighteenth century with which we are most familiar is one based upon certain spatial metaphors; the most familiar one is, of course, the Great Chain of Being. This metaphor involves, as Lovejoy pointed out years ago, the problem of plenitude and creation. If God desires by his Nature the fullest possible creation, then did he create all at the one moment, and are our perceptions of species coming to being and dying away merely mistaken? Or is creation a continuing or continuous process, and is His creation now coming to perfection, or then, or never? But, despite such paradoxical problems, the Great Chain remained a fixed symbol of the fusion of physical substance and moral 'reality.' 9 Within that cosmology, a piece of art was a permanent, a fixed object. We have been told repeatedly that the neo-classical comparisons were of poem and architecture or poem and painting. Over the last ten years there have been a number of studies pointing out that music was also used in such comparisons. Further, music then was thought of as a series of sounds, each 'frozen' in time, whereas music now is often conceptualized as a pattern of sounds and silences in time, once again, as a network of shifting relationships. 10 Even further, we have recently been told that architecture itself was influenced in the eighteenth century by associative theory, so that building and viewer interrelate, interact. 11 Along with scattered articles, go such investigations as those of Messieurs Alkon and Macey into time -time as used in works of fiction, time as conceived of by eighteenth-century writers and philosophers. 12 Such investigations can be tucked away conveniently under 'additional intellectual history/ but they focus on non-spatial and hence on newly 'discovered' areas of the eighteenth century.
Similarly, in historical theory, we have moved not merely beyond Lecky and Namier, but to articles such as that of Peter Hughes on Vico. Hughes, noting that Vico asserts that man creates social history in his own image, then himself hypothesizes that literature is 'figurative history/ that the author or 'editor' creates a 'structure of reality.' Thus, historicism is transformed into a branch of structuralism, as Hughes hopes, he says, to free criticism from 'Aristotelian mimesis and Kantian aesthetics.' 13 In a similar way, reader-response and author-text-interrelational articles, some by distinguished scholars in our field, tend at least gently to move us into the new cosmos. They range from such familiar and scholarly works as Mack's The Garden and the City to Grant Holly's claim that the text of Gulliver's Travels is a 'perpetual metamorphosis' of which the reader partakes and in which he becomes editor, if not author. 14 These ideas occur also in works about sensibilities and criticism in the eighteenth century itself. Murray Cohen, for example, dates a shift from an interest in the parallel between the order of words and the order of nature to a fascination with the connections between language ... and the structure of the mind' to the first half of the eighteenth century 15 -a revision of dates for the romantic sensibility? Robert Holub believes a similar shift in audience aesthetics reflects the change from patronage to a middle-class 'marketplace'; the result of this shift creates a focus on the 'individual and subjective responses of an hypothetically ideal reader.' 16 And Michèle Plaisant proposes a major shift in sensibility early in the eighteenth-century in authors, describing a thematic, semi-coded shift from physical to imaginative responses to the four elements. 17 Finally, even the rhetorical and generic analyses, which would seem definitely old-fashioned, include both traditional and advanced semioticstructuralist approaches. Thus, Wolper and Hahn's references to 'rhetorical' and 'generic' conceal rather than reveal the changes in our area. Robert Schmiel, for example, uses a study of the classical trope 'adyaton' to reach an almost structuralist reading of Pope, 18 while Guisseppe Galigani's analysis of 'Rape of the Lock' moves far beyond onomatopoeia and antitheses through what Galigani calls 'syntagmatic hyperbaton' and thence into signons, signatum, and almost pure structuralism. 19 Thus, the new wave is upon us and among us. And in many ways it should be welcomed. It has pointed us towards new areas of the eighteenth century -towards unexplored metaphors, interests, ideas, which our previously systematic generalizations may have ignored or undervalued. In addition, it has provided us with techniques, perceptions, modes of criticism which may enable us to see more clearly even the writers, the areas, and the works already part of the familiar terrain. These new interests are most clearly seen in certain areas: studies of the persona and of satire, of biography and autobiography, of such specific topics as Johnson's prayers, and in studies of certain texts -A Tale of a Tub which appears open-ended or Pamela and Clarissa which exist in two or more different manuscript or printed 'states.' 20 At the same time, of course, it creates difficulties. First, we have with us, as always, the crazies -and it becomes harder to distinguish the crazy from the newly significant when both use terms which simply affront our ideas of 'civilized' language. Some of the worst humoured reviews in The Scriblerian and in Eighteenth-Century Studies are reactions to critical jargon, even more than they are to critical craziness. 21 Secondly, and far more crucially, the new modes of criticism rely upon philosophical assumptions which challenge traditional perceptions of eighteenth-century thought. The 'new physics' posits an un-Newtonian universe; hypothetical particularity becomes a potentially insubstantial network of force; sub-atomic particles, if they exist, behave acausually and paradoxically. 22 Similarly, the new biology is non-Linnean. Developments in DNA research, in genetic technology whereby 'units of information' coded into the genetic structure of one species can be transplanted into another species, break down the traditional ideas of particular species and, in fact, of 'species' itself. Instead each biological creature may be seen, and can be created, as a unique composite of genetic information units, which may be changed in each generation either by complex recessive-dominant variations or by actual manipulation by human beings. 23 This paper argues that the new modes of literary criticism entail certain psychological and metaphysical views of artist, reader, and literary work which parallel developments in the new physics and the new biology. William Ray's recent Literary Meanings: From Phenomenology to Deconstruction examines a similar thesis about recent criticism and the new epistemology. Significantly, Ray begins with the intention of recognizing and perhaps resolving the paradox between two meanings of 'meaning': first as 'historically bound act, governed by a particular inten-tion at a particular moment' and hence shifting from moment to moment, intention to intention (or intendifier), and second, as 'permanent textual fact,' that is, something close to the determinate, the New Critical object. Yet Ray concludes with the indeterminate hope that '...history and theory will merge with interpretation in an eclectic form of literary study less obsessed with controlling truth than (perhaps) with its ability to provoke the pleasure of new ideas.' 24 Thus, Ray moves from an attempt to reconcile different views of meaning to an implicit attack upon one of them, partly because he believes that 'established' figures in academia defend determinancy (and its supposed historical, critical, and textual 'truth') out of pure selfinterest. 25 Similarly, though less politically, Murray Cohen believes the new methodologies will 'invigorate'a 'somewhat stale literature,' made dusty and remote by an older generation. 26 One finds, in response, Donald Greene's 'fear' that The Eighteenth Century may have a post-structuralist bent. 27 And G.S. Rousseau (himself no admirer of New Criticism, but undoubtedly an established scholar) suggests that phenomenologists, structuralists, and others create critical systems and terminologies as barriers to distance themselves from literature which they do not love. 28 Clearly an examination of modern criticism of the eighteenth century suggests then that certain hostilities, both psychological and philosophical, underlie the current controversies about critical method. Undoubtedly, such wayward motives as self-interest and tenure-hunger exist, but the roots of antagonism lie deeper. As an example of these roots, I choose the works of Murray Krieger, for Krieger, although his books are little regarded by eighteenth-century specialists, seems to me seminal to any explanation of the controversy.
In 1971, Krieger argued:
The secret, existential awareness which I am attributing to Pope, then, need not involve the claim to ontological chaos instead of ontological order so much as it involves the awareness of the ungraspable transcience of the fleeting moment. The eighteenth-century cosmic-aesthetic structure depended utterly on a spatial imagination that could freeze all flux into unchanging universals where time is not. But -during moments now and then -can this view, what has been called "Naive Realism," help but be seen as naive by any human being who suffers and who knows he is to die, who feels time and the unrepeatable, unpausing passing of its unmarked instants (never an instance)? If all rushes past, how can anything but the passing-changing non-instance be phenomenally there? Is not this what makes (and has made) existentialists of us all? Long before Kant -and, since Kant, without him -we should have learned to distrust the easy metaphors of convenience invented by our spatial imagination as substitutes for those flowing temporal metaphors that elude our rational need for the boundaries making entity-hood. So before, or without, Kant we had to wonder whether that gorgeously symmetrical imaginative structure within which the well-behaved cosmos was expected to conduct its business, that structure with its spatial completeness, was not, after all, no more than imaginative: the product of our mind, of its need for comfort, and not existing on its own out there. 29 Even as Krieger argues that a recognition of the partial indeterminancy of the physical world has no ontological consequences, he demonstrates that such consequences do appear. For, in his argument, a psychological awareness of flux in the physical universe means one can no longer be a 'naive Realist' (clearly a judgmental term). And, just as formalism and humanism seem interconnected, so that change in metaphysical belief leads Krieger in 1971 to a nihilist or at least an existentialist view of certain eighteenth-century writers.
By 1979, Krieger no longer tentatively suggests, rather he asserts that '... the monomyth of the eighteenth century ... is a myth we have imposed upon it ...' and that the writers of the eighteenth century actually shared the impulse towards indeterminancy, that they too were existentialists, and that they too recognised the Great Chain of Being, for example, not as a metaphorical expression of God's infinite and eternal order manifest even in flux, but as merely an existentialist metaphor, an illusion falsely imposed upon chaos. 30 Krieger's work on the eighteenth century is seminal, then, in several ways. First, Krieger supposes that, for whatever motives, the scholarly establishment has imposed a 'monomyth' upon the century; in Ray's terms, it has tried to control 'the truth.' And we may, in part, have done so. I would, of course, argue that scholars like Lovejoy and Monk had no such intention. Rather, by showing that certain intellectual patterns did appear, they meant to grant us freedom -freedom from having to define repetitiously those patterns every time part of them reappeared, and freedom also to see that they did not pertain to all writers, to all works, at all times or in the same ways. Yet Krieger's belief in an authoritarian monomyth lies behind the writing of many of the new critics.
Secondly, Krieger believes that modern existentialism is truth. Just as students over the next few years will find themselves accepting the new physics, the new biology, as truth, so the advocates of indeterminacy, of relativism, of existentialism seem, paradoxically, to wish to impose their own indeterminacy upon others. And those others include not only the moderns but the ancients as well. 31 Therein lies the crux of the difficulty created by the new methodologies. Each side of the debate believes that The Other' is both alien and a usurper. The older critics are said, from self-interest and an excessive love of determinism and tradition, to have created a monomythic distortion of the eighteenth century and its literary works. The newer critics, also from self-interest and an excessive love of elaborate critical vocabularies and theories, are believed to be in the process of creating another, and antagonistic, monomyth in which the eighteenth century and its works are indeterminate and existentialist. 32 Yet the works of the eighteenth century are more pluralistic both among and within themselves than any single system can in fact describe. Certainly the people of that century shared the pains of being human, yet some of them shared also strong beliefs in certain meaningful patterns and principles. Thus, with Krieger they may certainly have felt the uncertainty of life, but they may not all then have become existentialists -or post-structuralists. Even as a very young man, Pope knew perfectly well that Time conquers All, and we must Time obey/ but, in his middle years, he wrote also:
All are but Parts of one stupendous Whole, Whose Body Nature is, and God and Soul... 
